This article focuses on practical reasoning in political discourse and argues for a better integration of argumentation theory with Critical Discourse Analysis. Political discourse and its specific genres (e.g., deliberation) involve primarily forms of practical reasoning, typically oriented towards finding solutions to problems and deciding on future courses of action.
Introduction
The focus of this article is textual analysis within Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). We argue for a systematic approach to analysis of argumentation in political discourse and we focus on a particular argumentation scheme, practical reasoning. In what follows, we focus on a corpus of thirteen policy-making texts, the British Pre-Budget Reports delivered annually, between [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] , to the House of Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and we offer a detailed analysis of the November 2008 Report, which was an important stage in the development of UK government strategy for responding to the crisis. This article is part of our research into political responses to the current financial and economic crisis (see Fairclough and Fairclough forthcoming a, b) .
This focus on practical reasoning in political discourse is a new focus in CDA.
Because politics is pre-eminently a realm of action, where judgments and decisions about what to do are made and defended, the type of reasoning that primarily characterizes political discourse is practical reasoning. In our view, CDA has so far paid little attention to the primarily argumentative structure of political texts. Although some discourse-analysts, particularly the Discourse-Historical Approach (Wodak et al 1999 , Reisigl and Wodak 2001 , Wodak 2009 ), have regularly listed argumentation as one of their concerns and made extensive analytical use of the Aristotelian notions of topos and fallacies in critically assessing large corpora of data, it is safe to say that there has been so far no systematic attempt to identify, reconstruct, analyze and, on this basis, evaluate any particular argument in texts, or to undertake a principled critical discussion of argumentation in terms of the analytical frameworks of any of the major contemporary theories of argumentation. In particular, there has been no attempt to look at arguments in terms of fundamental concepts such as deductive validity, inductive force, deductive and inductive soundness, persuasiveness, rational persuasiveness, etc. -the familiar stock-in-trade of any 'critical thinking' or informal logic textbook. Neither has there been, to our knowledge, any attempt so far in CDA to investigate practical reasoning and practical arguments, in political or any other type of discourse. 1 Our focus on argumentation in political discourse may seem open to a common but (we think) seriously misplaced objection. Politics -the argument often goes -is not the realm of argumentation and reasonableness, decisions are actually taken much of the time on the basis of who has the power rather than on the basis of reasoning. This is, of course, not a 5 valid objection to the claim that argumentation (and practical reasoning) is a fundamental part of politics, and seems to spring from a confusion between argumentation and democratic deliberation: because a lot of what goes on in politics is not democratic deliberation, thenallegedly -it is not argumentation either. It should be clear that, in whatever way a claim about what should be done is reached (behind closed doors, through democratic public deliberation, or by manipulating public opinion), as long as normative claims and decisions are justified by reasons (even by 'bad' reasons, e.g., unacceptable, irrelevant or insufficient reasons), practical reasoning (and argumentation more generally) constitutes an integral part of political discourse. Being critical of the quality of public space dialogue or of some versions of 'deliberative democracy' (Dryzek 2000) is not one and the same thing as denying that this dialogue is fundamentally argumentative in nature.
A related and equally misconceived objection has to do with the distinction between emotion and reason in politics. Because it is often obvious that emotions play a large part in the way people come to a conclusion or decision for action in the political field, thenallegedly -politics is often not the realm of reasoning but of 'passions' and this is, allegedly, evidently undesirable. This negative view of emotions and the alleged desirability of decision-making processes based solely on 'reason' are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in which desires and emotions enter the practical reasoning process. More precisely, it is mistakenly assumed that desires, emotions and values cannot legitimately enter as premises in a process of reasoning, in other words, that a normative conclusion should be reached solely on the basis of belief-type premises embodying calm, detached 'reason'. To put it differently, that the world of human emotional concerns (what what we care about, what we value) has no place in reasonable argumentation. We address these confusions in our forthcoming book, yet the structure of practical reasoning we outline below should be enough to show that our desires, values and emotions are necessarily premises in practical arguments: without this motivational and emotional investment, no belief could ever prompt us to act one way or another, simply because nothing would really matter to us. In other words, our capacities for representing the world and our emotional dispositions act together to motivate us to act (Blackburn 1998 ).
There are, of course, reasonable and unreasonable appeals to 'passions' in arguing for a claim, and in saying that desires, values and emotions are indispensable premises in practical reasoning we are not saying that argumentation drawing on these motivational premises is always reasonable but only that it is not inherently unreasonable or unsound, as 6 is often mistakenly assumed in CDA. Contemporary argumentation theory (Walton 2008) does not treat emotional appeals as fallacious, unless they are irrelevant to the claim or are used to disguise the absence of relevant arguments. Indeed, to treat premises grounded in emotion, desire and evaluative attitudes as inherently problematic would be nonsensical as far as arguments for action are concerned, as all such arguments have by definition a motivational component and action results from the coupling of belief with what we want or value.
The structure of practical reasoning
Practical reasoning (embodied in practical arguments) is reasoning about what to do (as opposed to reasoning about what the case is, so-called theoretical reasoning) and attempts to motivate us (or give us good reasons) to act. The study of practical reasoning is closely related to moral philosophy (ethics) and it is in this branch of philosophy that most work on practical reasoning has been accomplished to date. For a very useful survey of developments since the 1980's see Millgram (2001) , for older approaches see Gauthier (1963) and Raz (1978) ; for an understanding of the relationship between practical reasoning and various types of ethical frameworks, including decision-making frameworks, see Millgram (2005) and Audi (2006 Audi ( , 2009 Audi (2001) provides a unified account of practical and theoretical rationality, from a double perspective -moral theory and epistemology. In the field of argumentation theory, the most significant contributions belong to Walton (2007) , who defines practical reasoning as a defeasible argumentation scheme, leading to a conclusion that is provisionally acceptable subject to the asking/answering of appropriate 'critical questions' (Walton 2007: 33 ). An excellent account of practical reasoning, connecting its normative criteria to Habermasian 'communicative rationality', can be found in Bickenbach and Davies (1998) .
Practical reasoning arises in response to problems which confront us as agents in the world. Typically, practical reasoning involves arguing in favour of a conclusion (claim) that one should act in a particular way as a means for achieving some desirable goal or end. Thus, practical reasoning takes a goal (for example, something you want) as major premise and a means-goal conditional proposition as minor premise and concludes that, given the goal and given that a certain action is the means to achieving that goal, the action in question should be 7 performed. The action, in other words, is intended to lead from the (undesirable) set of present circumstances, needing transformation, to the desired end. In reasoning practically towards a normative claim for action, we are therefore reasoning from cognitive and motivational premises (from beliefs and desires). This is Audi' where decisions on what to do need to be taken, often under circumstances in which the right or best course of action is unclear or contentious. Politics is centrally about decision making and decision making is effected mainly through practical reasoning, which can be embedded in various types of interaction, e.g. public or private deliberation, negotiation, debate. We think that an instrumentalist approach is well supported by the logic of political discourse: various types of political action that are defended in political discourse are means towards the realization of desirable political goals, seen as states of affairs or modes of social organization informed by various moral-political values (e.g., justice, equality, freedom). 3 Most often, practical reasoning occurs in a problem-solution context. Typically, argumentation starts with a description of the situation as a 'problem' and tries to find a 'solution' to (a 'means' of) overcoming the problem. While some practical arguments emphasize the problem-solution relation (e.g., 'in these difficult circumstances, we should do x'), others emphasize the means-goal relation ('if we do x, then we will achieve our aims').
In a context of uncertainty and/or risk, where several alternative courses of action are 8 conceivable, practical arguments try to balance a number of variables (situation, goals, possible costs and benefits, but also moral considerations, which may override cost-benefit calculations) to arrive at or justify a certain type of action (or solution) as the right one. Walton (2007) discusses two types of practical reasoning: instrumental and valuebased (normative). The latter contains an evaluative statement (a Value premise) amongst the premises. In our view -which is distinct from the views of the above theorists -the Value premise acts to restrict the set of possible actions that can be taken in a given context, given the goals. If your goal is to divide a cake among ten children, any way of cutting up the cake will achieve that goal, but if the goal is coupled with the value of fairness, then only the action of dividing it into 10 equal slices will be the right thing to do in order to meet both the goal and the value in question. We claim that goals are new states of affairs, new situations that can be brought about by means of action. Typically, the Goal premise refers to a state of affairs in which the agent's desires (needs, wants) are realized, in accordance with certain values or 'concerns'. The agent's goal might be a particular outcome that he desires (because it fulfils some value), or an 'ethical goal' of having done his duty in a given set of circumstances. In the latter case, strictly speaking, the agent might end up not doing what he desires but what he feels bound to do by his duty or by a particular role he feels bound to adopt; nevertheless, we can still speak about a 'desire' or 'concern' to fulfil this duty or role (presumably outweighing other desires).
We often act against our desires and inclinations (as internal, motivating reasons) and in accordance with external reasons (duties, obligations, commitments) which we recognize and accept and care about enough to be moved to action. Some philosophers, inspired by Hume, will then say that overall, our actions are always in the last instance determined by what we desire, value or care about, by our 'concerns' (Blackburn 1998) . Consequently, that beliefs have no motivating force on their own until coupled with a sense that something is of value, or that we care about it in one way or another, i.e., reason is merely instrumental in relation to desire. Desires ('concerns') are therefore the ultimate motivators: to say that I have a reason to do something is to say that the reason in question is an internal psychological motive, e.g. I want to act that way. Other philosophers, however, will say that external reasons such as promises we have made or obligations we are under are clearly independent of our desires. They can however become the ground of a desire to do the action in question but the desire derives from the recognition of the obligation and is therefore not basic. Some of our reasons for action are 'desire-dependent' but others are genuinely 'desire-9 independent': we have a reason to act on them (an external reason) even when we choose not to act that way (Searle 2010 ): we may not care but we ought to care about that reason. 4 Practical reasoning is sometimes reconstructed as being a deductive or inductive type of argument (Audi 2006, Bowell and Kemp 2005) . Like inductive arguments, practical arguments can be good arguments even when the conclusion turns out to be false -i.e. even when it turns out that we had better not have done what (we thought) we had very good reasons to do -if they are supported by rationally acceptable premises which, all things considered, on balance, make it more reasonable to accept the claim rather than reject it (Bowell and Kemp 2005) . More often, however, practical reasoning is discussed as a mode of argumentation distinct from either deduction or induction, namely as 'conductive' argumentation (Bickenbach and Davies 1998, Govier 2001) . In conductive arguments, the support pattern is convergent, like in inductive arguments, but is not based on the • premises specifying what end we are pursuing (e.g., what we want or desire) -the Goal premise;
• a conditional warrant that specifies an action (a means) and says that if such-and-such action is performed, the desired end will result -the Means-Goal (instrumental) premise;
• premises that define the initial state or situation (the 'problem') -the Circumstantial premise;
• (Ricoeur 2008: 189) . This view captures the necessary 'chaining' of actions oriented towards a certain desirable goal that makes it possible to speak of a 'strategy' rather than a random sequence of unrelated actions, and shows how a goal, once attained, can become a means towards a further goal. But, we argue, it is not only means and goals that are chained together whenever a coherent strategy is pursued. Once achieved, as a result of action, a goal also creates a new context of action and makes it possible to envisage and pursue new goals. Therefore, goals and circumstances are also interlinked, in the sense that present goals (as imagined, desirable futures state-of-affairs), once transformed into reality, become the circumstances of future action towards new goals. According to the first PBR the problems ('challenges') that Britain was facing in 1997 were: low productivity, insufficient employment and high economic instability. In Gordon Brown's words, for forty years Britain's 'unenviable history' had been one of 'boom and bust', or 'stop-go', marred by a 'failure to take the long-term view'. There was, therefore, a 'real choice' to be made, between, 'muddling through as we have done for decades from one stop-go cycle to another', or 'breaking with our past, burying short-termism and securing long-term strength through stability, sustained increases in productivity, and employment opportunity for all'. The PBR defended the latter choice, as the only way to deliver the 11 'national economic objectives' of 'high and stable levels of growth and employment'. The values that guided the actions advocated were 'fairness', 'openness' and 'responsibility'.
In 1998, the PBR announced that the Government had set itself the goal of 'steering a course of stability' against the background of a 'global downturn' originating in Asia and affecting economic growth worldwide. In circumstances of 'global financial instability', in an 'uncertain world', the Government announced 'long term decisions' aimed at 'breaking with short-termism' and 'boom-and-bust', most notably the successful implementation of a 'stable monetary and fiscal framework' -the Code for Fiscal Stability. In 1999, the Government set itself the aim of 'locking in' the stability it had successfully delivered in spite of 'global turbulence' and 'predictions of recession' and argued in favour of leaving behind the 'sterile century-long conflict between enterprise and fairness', between the left and the right, and of 'pursuing both enterprise for all and fairness for all' in order to 'set the course for a Britain of stability and steady growth'.
Successive PBRs recorded various changes in the political and economic situation worldwide. With these changes came more or less marked adjustments in strategies for action and in certain short-term goals, while long-term goals and values remained relatively In 2009, the PBR was once again set against 'a critical time for our economy and for our country'. Having successfully responded to the 'the biggest financial crisis for over half a century' through a 'set of coordinated steps', the Government's task was now 'to secure the recovery and promote long-term growth'. In order to do so, the Chancellor argued against the view that the budget deficit should be reduced by making cuts in public services, as this would only be 'putting recovery at risk'. The Report defended the interventionist strategy adopted by the Government in the previous year (allowing borrowing to rise), as a 'choice between two competing visions', with different final outcomes -'securing recovery or wrecking it' -and different underlying values: 'a choice between ambition driven by the values of fairness and opportunity, or austerity driven by an out-dated dogma', between the project of a 'fair society where all prosper and a divided society that favours the wealthy few'. Fairness was again very prominent in the speech, e.g. 'fairness in tax is a crucial part of maintaining fiscal sustainability', which is why 'the biggest burden will fall on those with the broadest shoulders'. We begin with an overall presentation of the content of the Pre-Budget report, trying to identify the main normative claims that are made and the various types of reasons that support them. We are at the same time trying to offer a rich description of the various alternative formulations in which the same basic content is expressed in various places in the text. It is one of the hallmarks of CDA that linguistic form matters, that choices made as to how to express certain content are of crucial importance. It is of course significant that the circumstantial premises are formulated in terms of 'exceptional' circumstances, or as 'global financial turmoil' -the latter, for instance, suggests similarities with natural calamities where no human agency and responsibility can be imputed. However, such choices (e.g., loaded,
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'persuasive' definitions in the circumstantial premises) can themselves be questioned in terms of a framework for the critical evaluation of arguments, which provides a sounder basis of critique than treating them as isolated features of texts, as often happens in CDA.
For reasons of space we have abridged the text considerably -what is left is mainly a set of repeated formulations of the basic normative argument for action.
Mr Speaker, my Pre-Budget statement today is made against a background of economic uncertainty 1 not seen for generations. These are extraordinary, challenging times for the global economy. And 2 they are having an impact on businesses and families right across the world. 3
Mr Speaker, in these exceptional economic circumstances, I want to take fair and responsible 4 steps to protect and support businesses and people now -while putting the public finances on the right 5 path for the future. That is what I will do today. My central objective is to respond to the consequences of this 7 global recession on our country, both now and in the future, so that we are ready to take full 8 advantage of the recovery of the world economy. 9
My aim is to provide support and protection for families and businesses when they need it 10 most. To maintain our commitment to investing in schools, hospitals and the nation's key 11 infrastructure. And to put in place the measures necessary to ensure sound public finances in the 12 medium term so that as a country we live within our means. Not one single initiative, but a 13 comprehensive plan, to support families, business and the economy. 14 And because of the wide ranging measures I am announcing today and the many strengths of 15 the British economy, I am confident that the slowdown will be shallower and shorter than would have 16 been the case. 17 I am also confident that the UK, as an adaptable and open economy, will be well positioned to 18 benefit from a return to growth in the world economy. 19 Mr Speaker, every country in the world is facing the impact of this crisis on their own 25 economy. There is a growing international consensus, although unfortunately not in this House, that 26 we must act now to protect people and to help pull our economies out of recession. 27
For there is a choice. You can choose to walk away, let the recession take its course, adopting 28 a sink or swim attitude, letting families go to wall. This is the no action plan. 29 support businesses and families, by increasing borrowing, which will also reduce the impact and 31 length of the recession. 32 I will do whatever it takes to support people through these difficult times. That's why my Budget Report today represents a substantial fiscal loosening -to help the economy now -with a 34 £20bn fiscal stimulus between now and April 2010, around one per cent of GDP. 35
Before I describe the detail of how the Government will support people, let me turn to the 36 fiscal framework which will help us ensure fiscal sustainability. The Government introduced the Code 37
for Fiscal Stability in 1998, committing itself to conducting fiscal policy in accordance with a clearly 38 stated set of principles. Our objectives are, and remain, to support the economy, to ensure medium-39 term sustainability and maintain public investment. (...) But today Britain -like every other country 40 in the world -faces an extraordinary global crisis, which means significantly lower tax revenues, both 41 now and in the medium term. In the current circumstances, to apply the rules in a rigid manner would 42 be perverse and damaging. We would have to take money out of the economy, making a difficult 43 situation worse. 44
So it is right that in this Pre-Budget Report we do all we can to support the economy, but also 45 ensure fiscal sustainability in the medium term. This all means that borrowing will be significantly 46
If we did nothing Mr Speaker, we would have a deeper and longer recession, which would 48 cost the country more in the long-term. In these exceptional circumstances, allowing borrowing to rise 49 is the right choice for the country, as the CBI, the Institute of Directors, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 50 the IMF, and many others, have all said in recent weeks. 51
Mr Speaker, we will continue to invest in public services -just as we have done over the last 52 ten years. (...) By continuing to make efficiency savings, we can help fund the action needed to help 53 families and businesses. But we will also ensure spending continues to rise from £584bn last year to 54 £682bn in 2010/11. (...) As businesses and families across the country carefully watch what they 55 spend, it is only right that the Government works even harder to make savings. 56
Mr Speaker, I now turn to a wide range of measures which I am taking to support the 57 economy and the people of this country. They will help businesses, support home-ownership and 58 boost people's incomes now. Bringing forward capital spending, on major projects, supports jobs and 59 businesses. It is right that, at this time, we re-prioritise investment, from within the existing three-year 60 limits, so that more money is being spent now, when the economy is weaker. (...) 61
Mr Speaker, this spending will help put money into the economy in the coming months. But 62 to prevent the recession deepening, we also need to take action to put money into the economy 63 that, as we all benefit fairly from the exceptional measures we take today, we should all share fairly 75 the burden of the future. 76
Taken together these steps will ensure that there is extra money flowing into the economy 77 now when it is needed most, but we can reduce borrowing as growth returns. The text contains several formulations of the same basic argument on what ought to be done in response to the crisis. The first one occurs in lines 1-14 in our excerpt, where there is a brief description of factual circumstances, immediately followed by an announcement of the Chancellor's 'objectives' or 'aims'. There are immediate goals: 'to protect and support businesses and people now' and 'maintain our commitment to investing in schools, hospitals and the nation's key infrastructure', and there are medium-term goals: 'putting in place the measures necessary to ensure sound public finances'. A distant goal is mentioned, that of eventually being ready to take advantage of 'economic recovery' (later reformulated as 'pulling the country out of the recession'). Given these circumstances and goals, the speaker announces his intention to take a number of 'fair and responsible steps' (i.e., concrete actions) informed by the values of fairness and responsibility. This is the core of any normative practical argument: given certain circumstances and certain goals, a certain type of action, informed by certain values, is advocated in the claim as the right thing to do, and -as in this case -can be followed by public expression of intention (commitment) and decision to act.
From the start, the speaker makes it clear that what is presented is 'not a single initiative' (not a single action) but a 'comprehensive plan', a 'wide ranging' set of (interconnected) 'measures', intended to take the country from the current (undesirable) situation to a future situation in which the effects of the recession have been overcome. We will refer to this 'plan' as a strategy, emerging from a certain description of current circumstances and informed by certain values and by cost-benefit and efficiency calculations. Arguably, a different strategy for action could be equally successfully defended starting from a different description of the situation, different values, etc., while the goal (a future in which the recession has been overcome) could be the same. In fact, this is what usually happens when two parties deliberate on the best means towards a shared goal: each will try to show that the goal can be achieved only starting from their own premises.
The argumentation advances simultaneously on two distinct planes in this text: there is 'practical reasoning' (what needs to be done, including reports on previous deliberation) and there is 'theoretical reasoning' (what is predicted to happen based on present circumstances). Practical reasoning is mostly reported: the text is a 'report' of a process of collective practical reasoning (deliberation) and is thus at one remove from the original process of practical reasoning itself. This is practical reasoning that has already resulted not only in a normative conclusion (judgment) but also in a collective decision and commitment 18 to act that are now being communicated to the public. These facts are not without importance:
arriving at a belief as to what the right action is does not always lead to the intention, decision, let alone the public commitment to act in that way.
After this initial formulation of the main argument, Darling turns to a detailed description of the international situation (omitted from our extract): there is a narrative of uninterrupted beneficial growth in the past decade, followed by an account of how the crisis arose and an explanation of its causes ('the root of today's problems are failings in the global financial system'), with narrative and explanation integrated within the overall argument. He then gives an account of what has already been done to combat the effects of the crisis (a 'scheme' to 'recapitalize banks') and an assessment of Britain's strengths in the face of this unprecedented 'global turmoil'. There are also references to the conclusions of the G20 summit in Washington (October 2008), where a 'comprehensive range of measures was agreed to increase transparency of financial activities, ensure better international supervision and prevent excessive risk taking', as well as to domestic decisions 'to make supervision and regulation more effective'.
Lines 21-24 contain the second formulation of the main argument, this time with a more precise formulation of the need to take action (exactly what action is still not specified at this stage): 'So we need action now' (Claim) in order 'to boost the economy' and 'help us emerge quicker' and 'stronger' from these 'difficult times', and 'face the future with confidence' (Goals of various types, more immediate or distant, and Circumstances). This is followed by a section containing the economic forecast for the following years, with recovery already forecast to be underway in 2010 (GDP growth will be once again positive, between 1.5 -2 %). The claim, circumstances and goals are reasserted and made more specific in lines 25-27: as 'every country is facing the impact of this crisis on their own economy', 'we must act now to protect people and to help pull our economies out of recession'. At this point, the claim is supported in a different way ('there is a growing international consensus' that this is what we must do, an argument from authority), and a counter-claim is introduced by referring to the existence of an alternative strategy: there is a 'choice' -the speaker says -namely, 'you can choose to walk away, let the recession take its course, adopting a sink or swim attitude, letting families go to wall' (28-29). There is an implicit negative assessment of the value premises that underlie this counter-argument (a 'sink or swim' attitude implies not caring whether families would 'go to the wall', not caring about people's needs). This is what the Chancellor calls 'the no action plan', attributing it to an unspecified group of politicians (presumably the Conservatives). The decision he defends is the decision to act, in order 'to support businesses and families by increasing borrowing', which will 'reduce the impact and length of the recession'. So in line 31 the main type of action that will bring about the desired immediate and long-term goals is (finally) explicitly formulated as 'increasing borrowing'.
Between lines 36-44 the argument addresses a potential objection to the claim it makes, arising from previous strategies (the 1998 Code for Fiscal Stability, which placed limits on borrowing) which are now seen to clash with the course of action advocated. This potential objection is addressed by appealing to the new 'extraordinary' circumstances in which 'to apply the rules in a rigid manner would be perverse and damaging' and 'make the situation worse', not better. In other words, in the new context, the costs of following previous strategies would outweigh the benefits (Cost-Benefit premise). There is an explicit reaffirmation that the overall objectives ('to support the economy, to ensure medium-term sustainability and maintain public investment') have not changed with respect to the past, only the situation and the action strategy have changed. This leads to a reaffirmation of the 'rightness' of the goal of supporting the economy and the people (line 45) and of the chosen action: 'allowing borrowing to rise is the right choice for the country' (lines 49-50). The claim is also independently supported here by an argument form authority ('as the CBI, the Institute of Directors, Institute for Fiscal Studies, the IMF, and many others, have all said...') and by a reassertion of the Cost-Benefit premise ('If we did nothing..., we would have a deeper and longer recession, which would cost the country more in the long-term') -in other words, the alternative strategy will not deliver the goals.
The next few paragraphs (lines 52-56 here) introduce a new line of argumentation, no longer aimed at justifying borrowing, but saving money ('efficiency savings'), to obtain extra funds for supporting families and businesses, coupled with a commitment to increase spending in the public sector. This is a separate argument and a distinct part of the overall strategy and, for reasons of space, we cannot discuss it here. The remainder of the speech (over half of it, omitted here apart from lines 57-76) is devoted to detailing a 'wide set of measures' aimed at 'supporting the economy and the people'. These are measures aimed at helping businesses, home-owners, people affected by unemployment, etc. Some measures are medium term (bringing capital forward to create jobs in infrastructure, re-prioritising given the circumstances, and given a set of desirable goals and a set of values, and given that it is possible in the context to take certain measures that will meet both the goals and values, the Government should take these measures. By implication, alternative strategies (the 'no action' plan) would not deliver the goals.
The end of the report sums up the strategy in various ways: 'taken together', these 'steps' will ensure our immediate and more distant goals ('fiscal support now and fiscal sustainability both now and in the future'); if this plan of action is pursued ('and as a result of my decisions today...'), 'I will bring the current budget back into balance by 2015/16' -presumably the ultimate goal. The concluding sentences (lines 81-87) review the circumstances ('these are exceptional times', 'difficult times'), claim that 'action' and 'exceptional measures' are needed and restate a number of goals ('helping businesses', 'helping homeowners', 'helping people into work', 'boosting incomes'). The result of the practical deliberation is again reported ('we have made our choice', 'the Government has taken a deliberate decision') and a public commitment is made again to putting it into practice.
Argument reconstruction
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We now focus on the argument in support of action and identify the premises involved. The two diagrams represent the argument as it advanced initially (lines [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] and reformulated later (lines 25-51). In the premises we suggest below we are preserving the original wording, while in the diagrams, for technical reasons, we are reformulating the arguments succinctly. 
Means-Goal
(If we put in place this plan of action, then we will achieve the goals.)
At this stage, the argument can be represented as follows ( Figure 1 ) 7 :
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In lines 25-51, the argument is developed to include not only a more explicit reiteration of the claim but also additional support for the claim, in the form of arguments from authority and a clear cost-benefit premise. Most importantly, the speaker also deals with a counter-argument (refutation) and an anticipated objection. We are focusing mainly on lines 25-51 (where the argument is reformulated twice) but, to give a complete picture, we also include in the diagram the 'efficiency' premise implicit in the 7 iterations (in the second half of the text) of this as the best plan that makes the achievement of the goals possible, i.e. the most efficient type of action (i.e., the goal of protecting people would not be achievable otherwise, by some alternative plan of action). Circumstances 'Every country in the world is facing the impact of this crisis on their own economy', these are 'difficult times'; Britain 'faces an extraordinary global crisis', 'exceptional circumstances'.
Goals
Our goals are to 'protect people and pull our economies out of recession', 'reduce the impact and length of the recession'; 'support the economy but also ensure fiscal sustainability in the medium term'.
Values
Our values are 'fairness and responsibility'.
Means-Goal
(If we act now, by increasing borrowing, we will achieve these goals.) 
Cost-Benefit
Dealing with
Counterargument
Counter-argument (as represented by speaker): the right thing is not to act, 'walk away', 'let the recession take its course' -the 'no action plan'. [Instead of being concerned with people's needs (hence the goal of 'protecting' them), this plan, the speaker shows, is underlain by a 'sink or swim' attitude and will let people 'go to the wall'. Implicitly, this plan does not care for the effects of the recession on people, its human costs will be higher than the benefits, and should be rejected.]
Dealing with anticipated objection
The anticipated objection to the government's strategy is that it contradicts the provisions of the 1998 Code for Fiscal Stability, which placed limits on allowable borrowing. The speaker argues that the circumstances have changed and therefore 'to apply the rules in a rigid manner would be perverse and damaging' and would make the situation worse. So, given the new 'exceptional' circumstances and the new goals, and, implicitly, in order for the costs not to outweigh the benefits, borrowing has to rise. Figure 2 represents the argument as it is formulated at this stage:
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As the diagrams show, practical reasoning is reasoning from the Goal, Means-Goal, Value, Circumstances, Cost-Benefit and Efficiency premises (and optionally, from other premises as well: here, an argument from authority provides independent support, in multiple argumentation). Practical reasoning (and its assessment) means deciding whether, all things considered -given these goals, these values, these circumstances, these cost-benefit probabilities -the claim to action is sufficiently supported. Balancing all relevant considerations is often very difficult to do. Cost-Benefit and Value premises, for instance, can interact in complex ways. Cost-Benefit calculations are often overridden by the Value premise: regardless of costs and benefits to us, a certain course of action may simply be the 'best' because it fulfils some (moral) value. Alternatively, what we may feel is our 'duty' to do may be overridden by cost-benefit calculations. And the situation is complicated further by the fact that, at any one time, we may be under pressure to satisfy different moral obligations, and deciding which should prevail or have more weight is not always straightforward.
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Argument evaluation and its relevance for CDA
We now briefly address the question of how this approach can contribute to the critical objectives of CDA: would critical discourse analysts gain anything from the (no doubt, considerable) effort of acquiring the analytical framework of argumentation theory? We strongly believe they would, and that CDA analyses would thereby gain in systematicity and rigour. This might help CDA practitioners to avoid criticism of their methods of textual analysis -see for example Zagar's (2009 and forthcoming) critique, from within argumentation theory, of the use of topoi in the Discourse-Historical Approach.
In this article we have focused on analysis of argumentation and we are not attempting to offer a detailed assessment of the argument we have looked at. We only want to ways 'rational persuasiveness' or 'reasonableness' is distinct from mere 'persuasiveness' or from 'soundness'. A persuasive argument may not be rationally persuasive, an argument which is rationally persuasive for a person may not be so for another, (rationally) persuasive arguments may not be sound, etc. There is no space to address these subtle and difficult theoretical distinctions here but it should be clear that they are not irrelevant for CDA:
questions having to do with ideology (and its 'naturalization'), 'manipulation', or the question why people are often persuaded by arguments which should not persuade them (or so the analyst would like to claim) can be discussed in terms of a normative conception of argumentation.
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Practical reasoning is a presumptive or defeasible argumentation scheme, and the acceptability of the claim depends on how well the arguer can answer a set of relevant critical questions (Walton 2007) . In other words, an apparently acceptable practical inference can be defeated by adding a further premise, as a result of critical questioning. Even when the conclusion seems to be reasonably well supported by the premises, we might find ourselves rejecting the conclusion (for instance, at a later date) if, on balance, after considering the possibility of other means or other goals, or after assessing costs and benefits, or commitments we have to values, principles and norms, we find that another course of action is (or would have been) more reasonable. To say that practical reasoning is defeasible or presumptive also means that different agents might come up with a different way of weighing and balancing all considerations, consequently with a different conclusion. In fact, the Labour In addition to these normative criteria, various epistemic considerations are also relevant. According to Audi (2006) , good practical reasoning expresses a deductively valid (or inductively strong) underlying argument, with premises that are true (acceptable) and justifiably believed, and with a conclusion which is both justifiably inferred from the premises and justifiably held by the agent on the basis of these premises. In other words, good practical reasoning meets logical, material, inferential and epistemic criteria (Audi opinion, e.g. justifying the Iraq war on grounds of a desire for freedom and democracy -are not good arguments because they most probably fail the last two criteria, which are both epistemic in nature: most probably, the arguer is not committed to the conclusion on the basis of the premises that he overtly cites but on the basis of other premises (and he may in fact not even believe the overt premises). A similar flaw can be said to affect the main argument in the Pre-Budget Report: is the Value premise (the government's alleged commitment to fairness, its concern with people's needs) actually supporting the claim for action, as put forward by the Chancellor -in the material, epistemic and inferential senses above -or is it just a rationalization, a way of dressing up, in a way that will hopefully resonate well with the public, an altogether different set of less high-minded (more utilitarian, efficiency-driven)
concerns? We could argue, for instance, that to adopt a set of measures that is destined to ensure a return to 'business-as-usual', without any substantive reform of the economic system, is ultimately not really proof of a concern with fairness, or that a genuine commitment to fairness would support a different claim for action, e.g. a radical reform of the economic system that led to crisis, so that similar crises might not occur again in the future.
We could also suggest that Darling may sincerely believe that allowing borrowing to rise is the right choice, but that he is not committed to this conclusion on the basis of his belief in fairness, but on the basis of other unexpressed beliefs (e.g., the need to rescue the economic system rather than reform it). Such lines of questioning would be made available to the discourse analyst by the analytical framework of argumentation theory.
As we have already said, to say that practical reasoning is defeasible means that it leads to a conclusion that is acceptable subject to rebuttal by critical questioning (Walton 2007 . On this view, a set of critical questions can be attached to every argumentation scheme. This is the set of questions that Walton suggests for practical reasoning:
• Are there alternative courses of action apart from the one advocated that would also lead to the goal? (Other-Means Question)
• Is this course of action the most acceptable, the best among alternatives? (Best-Means Question)
• Should other goals be considered? (Other-Goals Question)
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• Is it really possible to do the action in the situation? (Possibility Question)
• What bad consequences of the action should be taken into account? (Side-Effects Question) (Walton 2007 : 354, Walton et al. 2008 If it turns out that there are indeed better means towards the goal, or indeed more reasonable goals that we could set ourselves, or if there are negative effects that we have so far failed to consider, then the inference to the claim is suspended: the best course of action might not be the one we thought the best. However, as Kock (2007a Kock ( , 2007b has convincingly argued, a practical argument in the political field cannot be so easily rebutted by critical questions.
There will always be other means, other goals, other values, many of these not obviously or necessarily 'wrong', as well as various costs associated with any political proposal. In fact,
there are often legitimate arguments on both sides of an issue (an outcome of value pluralism but also of the legitimately subjective way in which various considerations weigh with different people) and an arguer's failure to answer any one critical question in a satisfactory manner will not in itself be enough to discard his proposal for action. A similar argument has been made by Billig (1996) . The analysis and evaluation of practical reasoning will not tell us everything about social change; it will not tell us for instance whether action based on this reasoning will be effective in achieving social change, or what other facts about the world will make it succeed or fail to do so. But there are a number of things that such analysis can do. It can highlight the connections among people's values and concerns, their representations of the world, their goals (the way in which they want the world to change) and the actions they conclude are appropriate in order to take them from current circumstances to future desirable situations. It CDA to undertake critical analysis of texts in politics and other social fields.
Conclusion
In this article we have argued for an integration of CDA with argumentation theory in the analysis of political discourse. We have started from the assumption that political discourse and its specific activities or genres (particularly deliberation, but also debate and negotiation) involve primarily forms of practical reasoning, oriented towards finding solutions to problems and deciding on future courses of action. We have provided an analysis of the main argument in the 2008 Pre-Budget Report and suggested a reconstruction of two versions of that argument. In the last section we have also indicated in what way argument reconstruction and analysis can be systematically used in order to critically evaluate arguments, and how one can avoid textual critique having a subjective or ad-hoc character by grounding it in analysis of arguments and in the normative frameworks of argumentation theory. We have also suggested how analysis of argumentation can enable CDA to address its characteristic concerns in a more systematic and rigorous way and make a valuable contribution to the normative concerns of critical social science. (Bowell and Kemp 2005: 207) . So the 'best means' to reach our goals may sometimes be an action that scores low on efficiency and cost-benefit analysis but high in terms of compliance with a moral principle. After balancing different concerns, i.e., rights/duties versus cost-benefit, the former may override the latter.
3 Practical reasoning is the argumentative scheme underlying deliberative discussion, as a type of dialogue or activity type. This paper does not address this very important concept explicitly. The aim of public deliberation is to select a course of action by looking at reasons for and against one action compared with available alternatives. In contexts of deliberation, two or more parties are trying to decide on the best course of action (Walton 2007: 31) .
4 In philosophy, this discussion takes the form of a distinction between internalism and externalism (Williams 2001 , Searle 2010 ), which we explain in our forthcoming book. As far as the distinction between values and desires is concerned, values are different from mere desires in the sense that they are our stable, fundamental concerns. They can inform our desires and our goals or can enable us to take a critical stance with respect to them (Blackburn 1998: 67) . 5 We take the Humean emphasis on 'concerns' as underlying motivation from Blackburn (1998) . We are adding the Circumstantial premise (not present in Walton's 2007 account) on the common-sense assumption that no strategy for action can proceed in the absence of an understanding of the initial situation. Both our goals (desires) and the way we describe the circumstances are informed by our concerns: something is a problem or a goal only because of something else that we care about. The Cost-Benefit and Efficiency premises are suggested by Bowell and Kemp (2005) , according to whom they are needed in order to make the argument inductively forceful. Clearly, without them the probability of the conclusion coming out true, even from true premises, is not high enough. We think they support the Means-Goal premise, as they increase its probability. In our analysis, as in Walton's, the Value premise supports the Goal premise. Our suggestion is that values restrict the set of actions that are compatible with the goals, seen as desirable states of affairs, by excluding all those which are not compatible with the value in question. I can get rich (goal) by various means, but only some of these means are compatible with the set of moral values I adhere to. 6 We are grateful to Marilyn Oruwari (University of Bucharest) and Stefan Preoteasa (University of Manchester) for teaching us how to transform Araucaria diagrams into Word/Paint diagrams, as well as to our reviewers for helpful suggestions.
7 In this paper, following Walton et al (2008) and their typology of argument schemes, we have used a version of Araucaria for visualising the structure of argument. Araucaria is a software tool for representing arguments, developed by Chris Reed and Glenn Rowe (2005) at the University of Dundee. There are of course other methods for diagramming arguments and showing relationships between premises and conclusions. In pragma-dialectics, practical reasoning is briefly subsumed under the scheme of causal argumentation, in a three-fold taxonomy that also includes symptomatic and comparison argumentation, and specific critical questions are associated with each. Pragmadialectics uses its own numerical and graphic conventions to indicate relationships between premises and standpoints, and whether argumentation is single, multiple, coordinative or subordinative.
